‘Should a mammographic screening programme carry the warning: Screening can damage your health!’? by Thornton, H & Baum, M
Screening has a distorted public belief. In our desire for good
population coverage we have said that screening is simple,
effective and inexpensive. In truth, it is complex, of limited
effectiveness, and very expensive.
(Raffle, 1998)
The intention of this editorial is to contrast the appropriateness of
organizing a Citizens’ Jury (Stewart et al, 1994) to help reach a
decision on screening with the UK experience of the introduction
of the National Health Service Breast Screening Programme
(NHS BSP) a decade ago, drawing attention to the different
prevailing attitudes at that time, contrasting the ‘Forrest’ autocratic
era with the ‘Calman’ collaborative era acknowledging interdepen-
dence. It is our intention to suggest that the Citizens’ Jury method
of providing a democratic opportunity to consider such a major
question would, if well organized, not only involve the lay public in
the decision-making process regarding an important population
health care measure, but would be likely to provide, by careful and
appropriate selection of witnesses, a balanced presentation of the
many factors that ought to be considered before the initiation of
such a programme.
We also suggest that with the benefits of hindsight on the NHS
BSP UK experience a re-evaluation of the true benefits/cost ratio
of the screening programme in the UK is in order, viewed not
solely from the point of view of the benefits in terms of a possible
mortality reduction – i.e. to those individuals that benefit from
screening – but by taking account of all the costs, both financial
and human, to all those affected by organization of, and participa-
tion in, the programme (Thornton, 1998). It is with wistful regret
that we acknowledge that such an example was not available for
our Ministers of Health and health professionals in the climate of
the 1980s. Whilst acknowledging that the NHS BSP was in the
forefront of providing a well-intentioned and quality service in
attempts to deal with the scourge of breast cancer, we should now
be seeking out all the evidence (Thornton, 1997) to ask ourselves
what are the true successes and failures of our attempt. More
importantly, should we be asking if the NHS BSP should continue
in its current form?
We would agree with a recent editorial in the New England
Journal of Medicine (Sox, 1998) commenting on a recent 10-year
retrospective cohort study (Elmore et al, 1998) of breast cancer
screening and diagnostic evaluation among 2400 American women
who were between 40 and 69 years old at study entry which said
that ‘most people like to make important decisions about health
care on the basis of current facts rather than myth or peer pressure’.
This study found a near 50% cumulative risk of a false positive
result after 10 mammograms. These false positive results led to 870
outpatient appointments, 539 diagnostic mammograms, 186 ultra-
sound examinations, 188 biopsies and 1 hospitalization. We concur
with the idea that ‘those who counsel women about screening
mammographs should learn the facts and convey them accurately’.
The Panel Report of the National Institutes of Health Consensus
Development Conference contained the crucial sentences: ‘Each
woman should decide for herself whether to undergo mammog-
raphy’ (Sox, 1998) and that ‘Physicians should educate women
about the risk of a false positive result of a screening test for breast
cancer’ (Elmore, 1998).
In order to emphasize the importance of as wide as possible a
consideration of evidence, suggestions for categories of witness
are offered as follows: someone to provide the rationale/purpose
of screening; a member of the expert advisory group to the
Ministers; an epidemiologist; the Director of our NHS BSP;
someone with practical experience of running a model screening
centre; a clinician/trialist with experience of directing a wide
screening service; an intelligent, thoughtful radiologist.
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Summary The balanced presentation afforded by convening a Citizens’ Jury when considering a major question such as the introduction of
a breast screening programme is advocated. This method would enable account to be taken of all the costs, both human and financial, to all
those affected, both participating and organizing, as well as the benefits.
Provision of such a democratic opportunity enables consideration to be given to a broad range of factors, by selection of an appropriate
range of witnesses, with the advantage of involving the lay public in this decision-making process. Attendance by health correspondents,
medical journalists and other media representatives enables publicization of a democracy in action whilst helping to inform the wider debate.
Such an exercise could inform whether the NHS BSP should continue in its current form.
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This editorial is based on a paper presented at the First Presidential Symposium of
the British Oncological Association, 2 March 1998 at the Royal Society of MedicineOther suggestions are: a breast cancer patient who believes her
life was saved – perhaps a member of an advocacy group; a breast
cancer patient with asymptomatic screen-detected ductal carci-
noma in situ (DCIS); a breast cancer surgeon; a health economist;
a Health Minister, or perhaps the ex-Health Minister of 1989; a
manufacturer of radiography equipment; a sociologist or social
scientist interested in Public Health or an Academic in Health
Services Management. This suggestion is prompted by Sarah
Stewart-Brown’s piece in the British Medical Journal (Stewart-
Brown and Farmer, 1997) entitled ‘Screening could seriously
damage your health. Decisions to screen must take account of the
social and psychological costs.’
Also required would be an ethicist versed in the World Health
Organization’s Principles of Screening, as well as a mathemati-
cian. Michael Retsky of the University of Colorado, Colorado
Springs, USA is suggested because he is engaged in mathematical
modelling of breast cancer. His model predicts that only 15%
of patients with T1 tumours would benefit from adjuvant
chemotherapy, compared with 51% of those with T3 tumours.
Retsky says: ‘Ironically this means that adjuvant chemotherapy
and early detection may not be compatible strategies. This has
implications for screening. As smaller and smaller tumours are
found, with better long-term prognosis, therapies become less
and less effective, reducing the overall gains of early detection’
(Bonn, 1997).
It is recommended that a spokesperson for the 1% of the
population that is heterozygous for the ataxia telangiectasia
gene (ATM), where affected women have a fivefold increased
risk of breast cancer, should give evidence. They have an induced
increase in radiosensitivity which has implications for proce-
dures such as chest and dental radiography, mammography and
radiation treatment. Ursula Werneke (1997) has pointed out that
the risk–benefit ratio may be acceptable for therapeutic procedures
targeted at individual patients, but is not acceptable for prevention
programmes for sections of whole population, as in, for example,
mammographic screening.
To enlarge on the suggestion that a radiographer or a member of
a breast screening team be called is to give the opportunity to
present evidence on a rather unexpected aspect of the statement
that ‘Screening can damage your health’. In this case it is the
health of the professionals within the breast screening team. Such
a witness would enlarge upon the pitfalls and problems associated
with the withdrawal of ring-fenced funding. Enormous stresses
can result from cut-backs in departments managed by those who
do not understand the need for proper staffing and resources for its
organization, including the provision of proper information and
the risk of being named in the House of Commons if your false
negative rate is transiently raised.
Information providers have to tread an impossibly fine line
as the ‘window-dressers’ in the ‘shop-window’ of screening
programmes, which are a reversal of the usual doctor/patient
relationship. They aim for a target of 70% uptake to make the
programme work, thus dividing their loyalty between the
programme and the patient. When this fine line crumbles, it not
only damages the health of the numerous participants who were
the inevitable false negatives and false positives, but the doctors’
own health as well. They may have seen the quality of their
department eroded by inadequacies, and the threats or realities of
litigation looming. As the Lancet recently said in its editorial
(Lancet, 1998) concerning cervical screening where the comments
might equally well apply to the breast screening programme, ‘The
UK information leaflets and letters … are a model of research
based wording and design, yet only allude to the concept of false
test result, with little or no explicit explanation of what a false
result means.’ They may ponder that those who are damaged by
the programme did not appreciate the significance of such banal
phrases as ‘the test is not 100% perfect’ or ‘is not 100% accurate’,
which are deemed, after much re-drafting, to be sufficient indica-
tion of the inevitable false test results to a population used to
coercive healthism, who believe screening is good for you and a
responsible course of action. But, as Angela Raffle said of cervical
screening, ‘Screening has a distorted public belief.’
Those participants who have suffered dearly and may pay the
ultimate price having experienced a false negative will feel they
have been duped and their intelligence insulted as they re-read
the leaflets that only alluded to the concept of false test results
without explicit explanation of what a false result actually means.
Likewise, so may the recipient of a false positive result who
may have suffered invasive tests and treatment when neither is
needed. In their cases, the psychological morbidity is considerable
as these healthy participants – and their families – wait for results
of tests. As Calman appreciates, carers too can be damaged by
sub-optimal cancer care – even diagnostic! He also appreciates
that patients, families and carers must be given clear information
and that communication between sectors must be of high quality if
the best possible care is to be achieved (Calman and Hine, 1994).
The triple combination of a less than perfect test and a less than
perfect provision caused by less than perfect information can
cause triple damage: to screened patients, relations/friends/carers,
and the screening team.
Health correspondents and medical journalists and other repre-
sentatives from the media may be invited to attend Citizens’ Juries
with the advantage that this publicizes democracy in action and
informs debate.
We cannot prejudge the outcome of the new trial in front of a
fresh jury, but we would prefer to stand by that verdict rather than
the one of 10 years ago when the evidence was less complete.
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